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My position here today is a clear case of role reversal. In analyzing 
Treasury I, Treasury II and the House tax bill, I find the government taking too 
academic a position and this professor urging more attention to reality. 
Specifically, when I rank the most serious problems facing our country right now, 
tax reform doesn't even make the list. 
We can all readily agree that the current tax structure is full of well-known 
shortcomings. But, by and large, producers, consumers, and investors have adjusted 
to those shortcomings. Debating tax reform has introduced considerable 
uncertainty over the treatment of saving and investment. This uncertainty has a 
chilling effect on investment planning. Far more important than tax reform is 
dealing with the budget deficit, the trade deficit, and the pervasive debt problems 
-- rural and urban, foreign and domestic. 
Back in the classroom, it is challenging and useful to identify a more 
equitable and efficient tax structure for the long run. We can hope that such 
analyses will help to improve tax policy over the years. But in the context of 
today's pressing concerns, focusing on tax reform is not only irrelevant; it is 
Note: Dr. Weidenbaum is Mallinckrodt Distinguished University Professor and 
Director of the Center for the Study of American Business at Washington 
University in St. Louis. The views he expresses are strictly personal. 
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counterproductive. Debating tax reform now shifts attention away from the hard 
but compelling challenge of con trolling federal spending. 
Each of the recent versions of tax reform, including the House bill, would 
dampen saving and investment and, thus, economic growth -- just as the economy is 
slowing down. A smaller GNP means less revenue into the Treasury. It also means 
more federal spending for unemployment compensation, food stamps, and welfare. 
All of this adds up to bigger budget deficits. 
The House bill would make it more difficult for American firms to 
compete, even as international competition is becoming more fierce. The numerous 
blows to saving, investment and R&D would slow down the modernization of 
American plants. 
Corporate taxes would be raised by about $140 billion over the next four 
years, further straining our ability to compete. Many of the companies hardest hit 
by imports -- those in capital-intensive heavy industry -- would have their tax 
burdens increased most substantially. This is an unusual switch from the old 
proposition that you don't kick a man when he's down. 
The proposed changes in bank taxation would come at a time when those 
institutions are wrestling with the difficult debt problems of the private sector. 
For example, deductions for bad-debt reserves are eliminated, except for relatively 
small banks. Finally, the claim of tax simplification violates any truth-in-labeling 
law. 
Here is some support for these statements: 
I. The claim that the House bill is revenue neutral does not hold up. 
Projections of future federal revenues are based on overly optimistic estimates of 
economic growth. For example, the assumed 4 percent growth rate in 1986 
compares with the prevailing private-sector forecast of 3 percent. In a $4 trillion 
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economy, a 1 percent difference implies a substantially smaller tax base and lower 
revenue collections. 
II. That shortfall in revenue is compounded by the proposed shift of the tax 
burden from consumption to investment. Many provisions of the House tax bill 
would discourage saving and investment: 
1. The dividend exclusion is eliminated. 
2. The top capital gains rate for individuals is raised from 20 percent to 22 
percent. 
3. The cap on annual contributions to 401K contractual employee 
retirement plans is reduced from $30,000 to $7,000 -- and the employee in effect is 
also prevented from making an IRA contribution. 
4. The incremental R & D credit is reduced from 25 percent to 20 percent 
and extended for only three years -- when analyses show that the temporary nature 
of the credit reduces its effectiveness. 
My colleagues Laurence Meyer, Joel Prakken and Chris Varvares have 
estimated that, by 1991, the House tax bill would result in a level of GNP 2.3 
percentage points lower than under present law and unemployment 1.1 percentage 
points higher. 
In the process, we see a political perpetual motion machine at work. That 
is, the institution of the investment tax credit and of liberalized depreciation were 
originally hailed as tax reform. Reversing policy on these investment incentives is 
now justified as tax reform. 
III. The claim of tax simplification is a bad joke. The proposed 
distinctions between different categories of individual taxpayers and also between 
different categories of corporate taxpayers surely make it likely that tax returns 
will be more complicated in the future. 
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Whatever its other merits, requiring expanded use of accrual accounting 
cannot be viewed as simplification, not by anyone who has been exposed to at least 
a semester of undergraduate accounting. Of course, this is only forced upon 
certain businesses, not others -- a further complication. And the host of transition 
rules, albeit an inevitable accompaniment to a package of far-reaching tax changes, 
make for further complexity. 
IV. The claim of fairness is overblown. I fail to see the equity in 
eliminating income averaging. Why should people with fluctuating incomes pay 
more taxes than people with stable incomes? Why should the capital gains tax on 
timber sales depend on whether your business is incorporated? Why is the tax 
exemption of the college professors retirement fund rescinded, but not those of 
unions, companies, and fraternal organizations? Why does the effort to toughen 
the tax treatment of three-martini lunches and lavish entertainment also expand to 
the most modest non-alcoholic business breakfast meeting? Why should 
corporations who want to establish and expand markets overseas be forced to pay 
an additional tax on their overseas earnings? Why should tax credits for political 
contributions be deleted -- except for Congressional elections? 
V. The label of tax reform is misleading. The driving force in the House 
bill -- as in Treasury I and Treasury II -- is another round of income tax rate 
reductions. Given the goal of revenue neutrality, this means identifying the most 
politically vulnerable provisions of the Internal Revenue Code so that they can be 
changed to yield offsetting revenues. 
True tax reform would move in the opposite direction. It would start with 
the desired changes in the tax structure, and then adjust the rate tables -- in 
whichever direction is necessary -- to maintain revenue neutrality. 
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What Should Congress Do Now? 
Tax reform and deficit reduction are both important and desirable 
objectives. The choice in 1986 is a matter of putting first things first. As the most 
elementary analysis of national priorities shows, that means elevating budgetary 
control to the top of Congress' policy agenda. That is not a task for just the 
budget and appropriations committees. Virtually every committee of the Congress 
has jurisdiction over federal spending programs. That certainly is true of the 
Senate Finance Committee, with its broad jurisdiction in the key area of 
en ti tlemen ts. 
I suggest that Congress think in terms of a two-track approach. While the 
budget-cutting drive is accelerating, more moderately paced tax reform studies 
should be getting under way. Specifically, committee and Treasury staffs should 
undertake a careful review of the structure of the Internal Revenue Code. 
Drawing on the good work that they have done in the last several years in 
identifying special tax provisions, they should now evaluate each of them by 
weighing the cost (in terms of revenue foregone) and benefits (in terms of public 
policy objectives achieved). 
Where the studies reveal that the revenue loss exceeds the funds going into 
the end activity -- such as in many shelters that finance housing -- the conclusion 
would be clear: change or even eliminate the provision. But, in other cases, where 
the benefits (say, in terms of more capital investment and hence enhanced 
international competitiveness) are greater than the revenue loss, the provision 
would be continued. 
These tax choices would be based primarily on effectiveness rather than 
ideology. To state categorically that all "tax expenditures" are undesirable is 
foolish. Some may be a more effective and less expensive substitute for direct 
federal spending. 
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The time-consuming and comprehensive tax review I am proposing should 
take place while Congress and the President concentrate on the many difficult 
problems involved in cutting expenditures. In that manner, they can get on the 
path that leads to achieving the deficit reduction targets in Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings prior to making basic changes in the tax system. 
The result would be an effective one-two punch strategy -- instead of two 
wild and unsatisfactory swings that seem to be in store for us under the current 
procedure. The first punch at the nation's economic problems would be spending 
cuts and deficit reduction. That would set up the economy for the second punch --
tax reform. To state the matter a little differently, it is up to the Senate to put 
the horse of spending control before the cart of tax reform. 
